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an official journal of: published by:
Editor in Chief: RAFFAELLO COSSU


  • Michal Struk - Department of Regional Economics and Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University, Czech Republic

Released under CC BY-NC-ND

Copyright: © 2018 CISA Publisher


The debate about public vs. private provision of municipal solid waste management has been going on for several decades with no conclusive evidence in favor of either. The presence of relevant competition in the market seems to be more important than the type of the provider. In this study, we expand on this topic and use empirical evidence to show that what matters most is the willingness of the municipality to switch waste management providers. We compare the municipal solid waste expenditures of more than 60 municipalities in the Czech Republic that changed their waste management provider in 2008-2014, both before and after the change. The results show that such a change can, on average, reduce the expenditure by several percent, and change should therefore be preferred by the municipalities instead of perpetually extending contracts with the current provider. In addition, we show that it does not matter much whether the new waste management provider is a public or private company, as costs are reduced when switching either way.​


Editorial History

  • Received: 29 Jan 2018
  • Revised: 19 Jun 2018
  • Accepted: 03 Aug 2018
  • Available online: 09 Aug 2018


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